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ABSTRACT
Connected devices in the home represent a potentially grave
new privacy threat due to their unfettered access to the most
personal spaces in people’s lives. Prior work has shown that
despite concerns about such devices, people often lack suffi-
cient awareness, understanding, or means of taking effective
action. To explore the potential for new tools that support such
needs directly we developed Aretha, a privacy assistant tech-
nology probe that combines a network disaggregator, personal
tutor, and firewall, to empower end-users with both the knowl-
edge and mechanisms to control disclosures from their homes.
We deployed Aretha in three households over six weeks, with
the aim of understanding how this combination of capabilities
might enable users to gain awareness of data disclosures by
their devices, form educated privacy preferences, and to block
unwanted data flows. The probe, with its novel affordances—
and its limitations—prompted users to co-adapt, finding new
control mechanisms and suggesting new approaches to address
the challenge of regaining privacy in the connected home.
Author Keywords
Technology Probe, Privacy-Empowering Technology,
Network Disaggregator.
CCS Concepts
•Human-centered computing→Empirical studies in HCI;
INTRODUCTION
My home is my castle. This commonly-heard saying captures
the importance and significance of the home to people’s lives.
The home is seen as an essential dominion over which one
has complete control; a place providing essential safety and
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isolation from the outside world [40]. Since early human
civilisations, the home has played a role as a vital context
for nearly every essential activity outside work [14, 47]. The
protection afforded by the home establishes a safe space to
be genuinely one’s self, permitting the ‘free unfolding of their
personality’ [17], a retreat where one can be vulnerable without
fear of judgement, reproach, or attack by outsiders, and, finally,
a place to seek shelter when recovering and resting.
The introduction of connected digital devices into the home has
seen both positive and negative effects. Positive effects, such
as increased safety and convenience, have been brought about
by a variety of new capabilities, including advanced sensing
and delegation, as exemplified by the likes of ‘smart’ security
systems and virtual assistants. But these very capabilities are
also engendering a second set of effects, comprising concerns
that such devices are threatening the core values of safety,
privacy, and isolation of the home by introducing new vectors
through which external entities can surveil the people and
activities therein. These ‘foot in the door’ devices are seen as
bringing the kinds of surveillance-capitalism derived mass data
collection, profiling, and targeted advertising that have thus
far pervaded other online spaces into the most private physical
spaces people need to thrive [48, 67].
The ultimate consequences of intrusion by connected devices
into the private spaces of the home has yet to be fully
understood. Researchers and journalists have documented
the ways that devices are seen as creepy [21], or make users
feel constantly monitored or spied upon [12, 54]. Recent
scandals involving products revealed to have hidden sensors
not disclosed to end-users, including microphones in smart
mattresses [53] and home hubs [22], have further heightened
anxieties around digital devices in the home. Such incidents
have caused end-users, consumer rights advocates, and privacy
and security researchers to press for restrictions on data
collection, and the establishment of mandatory software
quality, security standards, and duties of care [29].
Addressing privacy in the home is challenging for at least three
interrelated reasons. End-users generally lack an awareness of
how their devices collect data about them, including the kinds
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of data collected, and the ways such data are disclosed and
used by various first- and third-party entities [23, 60]. Second,
even when such data uses are made apparent, individuals
lack both breadth and depth of knowledge necessary to form
informed preferences about such disclosures. Such knowledge
includes both a broad, contextual understanding of data sharing
norms, uses, and data protection requirements, on one hand,
and specific, detailed knowledge on the other, such as of
disclosure risks, or the reputations, business models, and
security practices of the companies handling their data [18, 66].
Finally, even when such preferences have been formed, users
rarely have the ability to take meaningful action to improve
their privacy, due to a lack of options or effective means of
exerting control [55]. When combined, these factors suggest
that residents of today’s connected homes may be stuck in
a negative cycle of dis-empowerment when faced with the
challenge of managing their privacy.
Motivated by these interrelated problems, we present the results
of a 6-week deployment of a technology probe, a functional pro-
totype “to find out about the unknown [...] to hopefully return
with interesting data” [26]. The unknown, in our case, was the
design space of privacy-empowering technologies for the con-
nected home—future privacy tools that might go beyond static
privacy options or labels to support dynamic situational aware-
ness of their informational exposure, and to help end-users
build up a rich, conceptual understanding of connected privacy
and risks over time. We wanted to explore how such tools might
provide targeted, contextualised information relating to their
particular situations to maximise relevance, and also to provide
the means of taking immediate action, thereby helping users
cross both their privacy gulfs of evaluation (i.e., understanding
their current situation), and execution (i.e., taking meaningful
action) [44]. Technology probes have been seen as ideal for such
initial investigations as they constitute “simple, flexible tech-
nologies with three goals: the social science goal of collecting
in-context information about the use and the users, the engineer-
ing goal of testing the technology, and the design goal of inspir-
ing users and researchers to envision future technologies.” [45].
Through our technology probe, Aretha, we sought to jointly
explore social science questions relating to privacy risks and
preference formation, engineering questions relating to the
feasibility of deriving understandable models of data disclosure
from network traffic flows, and, finally, design questions
pertaining to the capability and interaction design spaces of
privacy-empowering technologies.
BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
Our investigation was motivated by both theoretical and
empirical findings, including work on privacy conceptual
frameworks, preferences, behaviours, and perceptions,
especially as such topics relate to the connected home. In this
section, we provide a brief overview of the research that most
influenced our study and the design of the probe.
Theories of privacy, including conceptual frameworks for
understanding privacy in the abstract, can also guide the design
of privacy-enhancing technologies, such as by characterising
what it might mean to achieve privacy. Conceptualisations
of privacy as the control of information about oneself, or
‘informational self-determination’ [3, 62], for instance, frame
privacy-enhancing or enabling technology as that which
enables people to control how data about them is collected
and used, and to determine how their informational selves are
represented. The theory of contextual integrity [43] (CI) can be
applied to explain both the ends and means by which such con-
trol might be applied. Using the vocabulary of contexts, actors,
attributes and transmission principles, achieving privacy ac-
cording to CI means successfully regulating the transmission of
information to various actors so as to maintain the appropriate
sharing norms of the contexts in which they operate [4, 41].
The existence of context-specific norms for information disclo-
sure has been borne out by empirical studies showing that end-
users’ views on disclosive actions (such as data flows to compa-
nies) are influenced by both social and physical context(s) from
which such information are gleaned, as well as other factors
including the kinds of information being disclosed, perceived
norms around disclosures, individuals’ relationships with those
whom their data are shared, and the purposes of disclosure [5,
7, 18, 32, 36, 37, 38]. When violations of such norms are
revealed, the consequences are feelings of betrayal and being
“creeped-out”, whilst when such norms are respected, people
feel “in control” or benefited [51, 58]. Repeated violations of
expectations, and the inability to tell whether disclosures are oc-
curring, have been associated with feelings of being perpetually
listened to or watched, and even feelings of helplessness and
resignation, highlighting potential harmful phenomenological
effects associated with long-term violations of privacy [34].
The relationship between privacy preferences, intentions, and
behaviour is complicated. Early research suggested that people
may be divisible into a small set of distinct privacy ‘types’ [62],
but for decades, studies have noted discrepancies between peo-
ple’s stated preferences and their behaviour. Various attempts
have been made to explain (and explain away) these differences
[2, 33, 52], with some concluding that researching privacy in ex-
perimental isolation is unhelpful [15], and that privacy attitudes
are relatively unpredictable across different scenarios [63]. This
suggests a tension between approaches which aim to classify
users according to psychological or behavioural measures in
order to predict their privacy choices and adjust default settings
accordingly, and those which account for and even encour-
age the discovery of individual differences. Instead, privacy
preferences, intentions and behaviours need to be interpreted
alongside the competing pressures and incentives that users
face in real-world contexts. As a result, privacy-empowering
tools for the connected home cannot divorce the elicitation of
preferences and provision of controls from the ebbs and flows
of daily life. Beyond individual privacy, connected devices are
embedded in the idiosyncratic social context of the home, where
cohabitants with different needs and preferences must share re-
sources and responsibilities [20, 24, 27]. One additional theory
as to why end-users’ privacy preferences are seldom predictive
is that end-users’ preferences are not sufficiently supported by
an understanding of privacy risks or awareness to justify their
views. Indeed, studies have demonstrated that end-users (and
even many experts) lack awareness of all the ways their data
is being transmitted and used, whether via the Web, through
smartphone platforms and apps, or connected devices in the
home [66]. Such findings are not surprising given that user
tracking and information disclosures are, themselves, rarely
disclosed in meaningful ways to end-users of connected sys-
tems [55]. Indeed, when information disclosures are made ap-
parent in a form that users can understand, individuals have been
shown to articulate more specific and actionable privacy pref-
erences [23], as well as views on ethical, economic (business
models), and political dimensions of the data economy [59, 60].
Increased awareness and understanding of privacy risks, alone,
may not result in visible protective changes in behaviour for
other reasons. Tabassum et al. found that participants cited
trust in manufacturers, faith in regulatory action to protect
them, and infeasibility or inavailability of alternatives as
reasons for not taking further action despite awareness [55].
Greater awareness of the reality of the nature of data collection,
in the absence of available mitigations, might also increase
a sense of helplessness and resignation [59]. Such findings
suggest that people need to be aware of, and have strong beliefs
about, the efficacy of controls in order to be motivated to act, as
demonstrated in the context of security behaviours [35, 55, 61].
An alternative view to one that focuses on control over the
transmission of data is the social practice informed view that
instead promotes accountability [11, 16]. Such work has
proposed that systems ought to provide affordances to support
allowing users to hold manufacturers and service providers
accountable for their practices; researchers in human data in-
teraction therefore propose “liability, agency and negotiability”
as design goals to support such accountability [10, 28, 56].
Towards increasing both legibility and accountability of
individual devices, prior work has proposed privacy labels [31]
for apps, websites, and smart home IoT devices [50] that
indicate the types and quantities of data that are collected,
retained, and disclosed. Privacy fact sheets in buyers guides,
such as Mozilla’s Privacy Not Included1 are a realisation of
this idea, providing expert-curated summaries of key aspects
of data collection and handling of popular connected devices
for the home. Recent work has systematically attempted to
identify the factors that should go into these labels, examining
how such information factors into purchasing decisions [19].
But these approaches are limited by the fact that they relate to
devices as a whole (as opposed to specific uses/behaviours),
and that they are static, meaning they do not allow users to
understand how data exposure varies with particular uses, or
if exposure profiles change due to changes in apps or software
updates. Complementary to this body of work is a collection of
tools emerging from the security research community designed
primarily for expert users; these were used to inform our probe
design as we describe next.
DESIGNING THE TECHNOLOGY PROBE
The insights outlined above provide a challenging set of social
science, engineering, and design considerations relating to
privacy-empowering technologies in the connected home.
These drove us to formulate the following key design goals for
such technologies, and in turn, our technology probe:
1foundation.mozilla.org/en/privacynotincluded/
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For end-users  #  H# # # # # # H#
Actively Maintained  #  # # # # # # #
Open Source  # # #  # # # #  
Deep Inspection # # # # # # #  # #
Destination Labelling  # # # # # # # #  
Classifies Devices          #
Infers Behaviour #  # # #   #  #
Live Visualisation # # # # # # # # # #
Active Controls # # # #  # # # # #
Anomaly Detection #   # # # # #  #
Table 1. Comparison of Popular Home Network Analysers. Black circles
indicate feature presence, with half circles denoting projects designed to
be run by end users, but primarily used for research.
1. DG1 (Legibility) - To make the privacy-implicated activities
of devices legible to their users, in the forms of both real-time
and historical records of all information flows and their
destinations.
2. DG2 (Interpretability) - To help users interpret and form
preferences about data disclosure activities by providing
them with a rich conceptual understanding in the technology
and business models operating behind their connected
devices, including disclosure norms, risks, and purposes.
3. DG3 (Actionable Choices) - To provide in-situ privacy
controls that enable users to directly take meaningful action
on information flows to reduce exposure.
Overview of Existing Tools
We began the process of designing our probe by surveying an
emerging class of tools for monitoring connected devices in the
home. Table 1 summarises the systems and features of each.
Two projects were oriented towards privacy and security-
conscious end users: Princeton IoT Inspector and Fing.
The former was aimed at a general audience, prioritising
ease-of-use and a simple feature set including visualisations
of device activity, including a display of data destinations
associated with advertising or tracking. The latter was
primarily designed for securing and troubleshooting networks,
providing tools for advanced users.
Research tools providing smart device analysis capability fell
into three categories. Device fingerprinting in IoTSense [6] and
IoTSentinel [42] was able to identify devices based on the net-
work traffic they produced. Behaviour classifiers such as Home-
Snitch [46], Peek-a-Boo [1], PingPong [57], and HoMonit [65]
used machine learning to infer the reasons that devices were
sending data to particular destinations at particular times.
2iot-inspector.princeton.edu
3www.fing.com
A third kind of tool, including HomeNet Profiler [13] took
more holistic approaches rather than device-specific analyses.
Homenet Profiler collected MAC addresses and statistics about
all of the services advertised by devices across 2,400 French
homes. Meanwhile, X-Ray Refine [59] created data sharing
models using static code analysis techniques to build high-level
visualisations of smartphone users’ entire exposure profiles
resulting from their app use.
While the latter two projects come the closest to the subject
of this work, they only address DG1 (Legibility), stopping
short of providing educational material to increase users’
understanding, or providing actionable controls in-situ for
reducing exposure. This indicates an unexplored design space
for privacy-empowering tools that provide real-time legibility,
support users to interpret their privacy exposure through better
understanding of the technology and business models, and
provide active controls. This design space was explored more
thoroughly through the design of the Aretha technology probe.
Source code for the probe software is freely available under
an open source license4.
DG1: Legibility
Given the lack of transparency around how connected devices
in the home collect and disseminate data, we felt that a crucial
first step was to provide them with a view of the ground truth
about how their devices disclosed data. Aretha was connected
to the home router and acted as a WiFi hotspot, capturing
packet headers of traffic passing through it (this reduced
the amount of collected data and avoided the challenges of
inspecting encrypted payloads [49]). A third party service
was used to obtain information about the owner, location, and
threat status of external destinations. Unlike IoT Inspector [25],
Aretha included data from other connected devices in the home
(e.g. smartphones and tablets) alongside IoT devices.
The interface was based on that of X-ray Refine [59], which
had been usability-tested in previous lab studies. We adapted
this to present information captured from the network both on a
timeline, showing the ebb and flow of data throughout the day,
and as an aggregated overview showing the total information
exposure of the household (see Figure 1).
DG2: Interpretability
Previous studies have established that end-users often lacked
the depth of understanding of networked privacy necessary
to take views on risks and preventative actions [30, 64]. Thus,
we felt that in order for end-users to be able to interpret and
effective evaluate device disclosure behaviours, Aretha should
provide supporting educational and informational material
of at least two kinds: essential foundational knowledge
about networked privacy concepts and risks, and background
information about the specific companies handling their data.
To address the first, a short educational curriculum, inspired by
FoxIT [23], was assembled from content from the BBC, the UK
Information Commissioner, and various other sources, with
the aim of providing a broad overview of networked privacy,
including Internet basics, how and why devices sent data, and
information about data breaches, data protection, and kinds
4https://github.com/OxfordHCC/Aretha
of privacy risks. To provide concrete grounding for essential
abstract concepts, concrete examples were constructed, when
possible, from users’ own home disclosure profiles. Such
examples included illustrations of which devices within their
homes sent encrypted versus unencrypted data, and for what
purposes these data were being disclosed. Three iterations of
the curriculum were piloted via online surveys (total 14 UK
residents aged 18 or over), which let us evaluate the inclusion
and presentation of different types of information.
DG3: Actionable Choices
The third goal was to enable users to exercise control by being
able to take privacy remediation actions directly within the
Aretha display. Towards this end, we faced the challenge of
choosing or designing an appropriate method of control; we
sought a simple, yet effective method that could serve as a
basis for more sophisticated approaches. Since the concept
of a firewall was likely to already be familiar and was easily
explainable, this seemed a best initial fit. Unlike firewalls for
use by experts (which often work at the level of IP or MAC
addresses) we designed Aretha’s firewall to be user friendly by
using device and organisation names in directives (e.g. ‘block
all traffic between <Sam’s iPhone> and <Facebook, Inc>’). To
make such directives easy to specify, a simple drop-down-based
graphical interface was created that directly embedded the
ability to create directives into Aretha’s visualisations.
Pilot Field Test
To identify usability problems and improve the design of our
probe prior to our study, we deployed our initial version within
a smart home exhibit at a major building research centre in the
UK5. Seventeen members of the public were invited to spend
time with the prototype system in the fully-equipped smart
home test bed, connecting their mobile phones and viewing the
data destination visualisations on-screen. Feedback from the
pilot was essential in optimising screen layouts to prioritise the
visualisations participants found most useful and improving
reliability by identifying software and hardware bugs.
STUDY METHODOLOGY
We designed the main study to consist of a six-week technology
probe deployment with three families. As the goals of this study
were exploratory, we aimed for a longer-term deployment with
a smaller, carefully selected set of households. We felt a six
week duration would allow sufficient time for participants to
acclimate to having the probe in the home, and for use of the
probe to integrate with household rhythms and routines. It was
also seen as sufficient time for participants to be exposed to
and internalise the educational curriculum which was delivered
during the second phase of the study, as well as for members
of the household (other than the primary participant) to interact
with the probe. All materials from the deployment study can
be found at https://osf.io/6j8hc. The home deployment was
approved by our University’s IRB, and participants received
£200 in shopping vouchers for taking part in the study.
Figure 1. Time series (1-2) and aggregate (3-5) visualisations used in the probe interface.
P# Age Gender Id. Education
P1 25-34 M Postgraduate Degree
P2 35-44 M A-Level
P3 45-54 F Bachelor’s Degree
P# Self-Reported Connected Devices in the Home
P1 Laptop, Phone, Tablet, Watch
P2 Laptop, Phone, Alexa, TV, Camera, IR, Light, Socket
P3 Laptop, Phone, Alexa, TV
Table 2. Demographic information for the study participants (top) and
the types of connected devices they reported owning (bottom). Italics
show devices users reported intending to connect to the probe and bold
those actually connected according to network traces.
Participant Recruitment and Selection
Recruitment was done through a two-step process. First, we re-
cruited an initial pool of interested participants using the Call for
Participants platform, reaching out to several smart home hob-
byist communities online, and through a mailing list of partici-
pants from previous smart home research studies. Interested par-
ticipants were invited to complete an initial survey with the con-
nected devices they owned, who they shared their living space
with, and the geographic area where they lived. Second, we
drew on this pool of interested candidates to select three house-
holds that represented a variety of technical expertise, family
structures, and location of physical residence. Written consent
was collected from the main participant in each household, who
was required to explain the study to cohabitants and obtain
oral consent (we provided written material to help with this).
Demographic information on participants is given in Table 2.
Study Phases and Structure
At the start of the study, the same researcher visited each
household for installation of the probe. The hardware of the
probe consisted of an Intel NUC running the Aretha software,
an HD display, and a standard keyboard and mouse. The
NUC was connected to the participant’s broadband router via
Ethernet, and was configured to act as a WiFi hotspot to which
participants were asked to connect their home devices in lieu
of their regular WiFi access point. The interface was always
5The prototype did not contain the firewall tool.
on and continuously visible on the provided display, with users
able to toggle between the two screens shown in Fig 1.
Before installation of the equipment, participants were
interviewed at home for approximately 30 minutes. This
semi-structured entry interview was designed to capture
participants’ relationships with their connected devices,
including questions on their conception of what privacy meant
to them, what data they thought their devices shared with
whom, and the extent to which they felt in control of their
data online. While participants were encouraged to connect
as many of their devices as possible to the probe, the initial
briefing made it clear that this was not obligatory and that
they could redact information collected by Aretha at any
time. Additionally, some smart devices required an Ethernet
connection and thus could not be connected to the probe.
The deployment was split into three stages lasting two weeks
each, with participants instructed to interact with the software
approximately every other day (see Figure 2). In the first
stage Aretha functioned only as a passive display, encouraging
participants to experiment with it to learn more about their
devices and to familiarise them with the research software. The
second stage added the delivery of the educational curriculum.
The final stage of the deployment gave users the ability to use
Aretha to block their devices from communicating with compa-
nies of their choosing. Participants were contacted at least once
during the study to capture feedback and reactions that might
have otherwise been forgotten by the end of the six weeks.
Exit interviews were conducted at the conclusion of the study
and lasted approximately 40 minutes. Questions included
what participants and their cohabitants reactions to the probe
were, whether the participants had consciously changed
their usage of any devices as a result of the probe, and what
they had found most surprising about the data shown by the
visualisations. Questions on perception of privacy and control
from the entry interview were repeated, with participants given
copies of their earlier responses to reflect on and revise if they
wished. Participants were given the opportunity to review and
redact information recorded by the software, and device MAC
addresses were deleted at the guidance of our IRB.
Call for Participants
Participant Selection Entry Interview
Start Stage 1
Week 0
Check-in Interview
Start Stage 2
Week 2
Check-in Interview
Start Stage 3
Week 4
Exit Interview
Equipment Collection
Week 6
Figure 2. Structure of the Home Deployment
Analysis
Interviews and check-in sessions were transcribed and
anonymised by the researcher who conducted the session. Two
researchers independently familiarised themselves with and
coded the transcripts following [8], meeting to review and
merge themes to generate the final analysis. A preliminary
round of coding was also conducted before the exit interviews
to allow emergent themes from the entry and check-in
interviews to be further interrogated. Network traces collected
by Aretha were referenced during the coding process. While
these alone proved to be of limited utility in understanding
how the probe was used, they were effective in allowing us to
triangulate critical events reported by participants.
RESULTS
All three probes operated continuously during the 6 week
period except that of P1, which experienced a network-card
failure that made the system unavailable for approximately four
days during the first phase of the study before being rectified
by the participant. All probes actively recorded network
traffic (packet headers) during the study, recording 112 million
packets from 19 devices to 428 unique destinations across 41
jurisdictions worldwide. On average, the top three destinations
by volume per participant represented 74% of the total traffic
observed by Aretha.
Thematic Analysis of the interviews yielded five major
themes: changing conceptions of privacy—how participants’
perceptions of what privacy meant to them changed as the
study progressed; personalisation of privacy concerns—how
participants’ understandings of what privacy meant to them
became more concretely related to their individual routines
and practices; household members’ interest in privacy—how
our participant’s cohabitants expressed interest in the probe
itself as well as the privacy practices of the household; and
everyday practicalities impacting adoption of the probe—how
participant’s usage of the probe (particularly the firewall) was
affected by routine happenings in the household. In the follow-
ing subsections, we briefly outline the journeys taken by each
household and describe these themes in the context of each.
Household 1
The first participant lived with his partner in their studio flat, and
was technically savvy. P1 was responsible for administering
the technology in the household, but online accounts were kept
separate between them. The privacy assistant was installed in
the main area of their studio apartment, where it was visible
throughout the study and used by both the participant and his
partner.
Believing that privacy was important to him, P1 had difficulty
elaborating further, mentioning tangential practices when
asked about the steps he took towards it (such as unsubscribing
from email lists and using antivirus software). Going into the
study P1 repeatedly voiced concerns that his long term use of
the internet meant that he had passed the point of no return with
regards to controlling the dissemination of his data online:
“I’ve been on the internet for so long that it’s just not going
to happen. Obviously now I can be more defensive and be
cautious, but I just think it’s out of control now”
As new companies appeared on the visualisations, P1 devel-
oped his own information gathering process built around the
UK national company registrar. Largely unconcerned about the
actual data being collected, it was the relationships between
the companies shown by Aretha that were of importance:
“So the systematic things I like to do when I research about
a company: how many people are involved, what are their
sponsors, what’s the share price now, how has it changed in
the past, what’s their next project, what’s their previous project,
did it change anything, were they successful?”
During the study P1 changed his broadband supplier, and
mentioned being curious about how his choice of ISP might
impact his data exposure (network traces showed a 275%
increase in avg. daily traffic to the ISP). Having the probe
display in the main area of the apartment allowed it to trigger
conversations between P1 and his partner about their data
flows. Having not previously been a part of the administration
process, his partner was able to educate and inform herself
about what their devices were doing:
“She used to open web pages and then instantly go and check
the time series, to just see that Yahoo was open, was there a
change?”
In what became a theme across the participants in the study,
P1 found the firewall to be an ineffective way of controlling
his data flows. This was mainly due to a fear of it interfering
with his digital activities, which were “everything”, instead
leading P1 to seek his own behavioural control mechanisms.
The curriculum content about the data economy led him to
reflect on the corporations that were indirectly benefiting from
his online activities, prompting him to use the ethical track
records, details of ownership, and shared interests uncovered
during his research to help align his purchasing choices with his
responsibilities around sustainability and ethical consumerism:
“So [the privacy assistant] is doing that by default, and all I’m
needing to do from the device is actually to spend my money
where everything’s fair, everything’s fine [...] so I don’t want
[...] one day delivery from Amazon because they’re not paying
their people fair. [...] and if I know that when I go on Amazon it’s
also sending data to X Y and Z, I’m also not going to buy from
X Y and Z because that’s my grudge against the company now”
In addition to considering the management of his data that
was already online as a problem that was too big to handle, P1
expressed scepticism of GDPR-based data rights as an effective
method of controlling his exposure—if behavioural models
of him still existed just without his name, then what was the
difference? P1’s Aretha observed 218 distinct companies
operating in 37 countries, highlighting the sheer amount of
effort required to meaningfully invoke his data rights. He
proposed outsourcing the task to an independent organisation
that would be able to handle revocation requests en masse:
“If someone [...] comes and tells me that we’re happy to remove
everything from the internet that belongs to you and give you
a new birth on the internet [...] then I might be interested to
start from scratch”
Household 2
The second participant lived with his partner and five children
in a fully equipped smart home. Many aspects of the house
were automated, and P2 was entirely responsible for keeping
everything working. The privacy assistant was installed in
the living room of the house, allowing for passive observation
whilst watching TV or carrying out other leisure activities.
The setup of P2’s home was by far the most advanced of the
three households, with smart devices touching most aspects
of family life. This way of living, to which smart devices were
integral, not only foregrounded the reliance of the household
on connected technology, but also highlighted how much
friction was exerted by adding privacy protecting measures to
an already complicated setup. P2 partly envisaged Aretha as a
way to validate his own previous privacy and security measures
on their home network.
P2 began the study with a more developed conception of
privacy, describing it as a matter of ‘give and take’, with him
combining the manufacturer’s description of what devices
were doing with “a little bit of faith” that they would operate
as specified. While P2 did keep track of the data destinations
that appeared over the course of the study, his son was also
monitoring the display and holding devices (and P2) to account:
“My son is quite technical and is looking at the main bar graph
a lot trying to see which bits of traffic are interesting to him,
like just now he asked why we’re sending so much data to the
weather service, which is a good question!”
Most surprising was both the amount of data sent to large
technology firms, outside of the EU (54% by volume), and the
frequency with which data was sent during periods of no or
low active device usage. As with the P1, P2 found the delayed
impact of blocking decisions interfered with the routines and
challenges presented by family life:
“Because you then have to go away and see what changes
happen a little bit later on [...] we’ve got the five kids running
around and sometimes I was reticent to click something in case
it affected something and I wouldn’t get a chance to come back
to it”
This fear came true when blocking access to a specific company
removed comments on YouTube videos. He also noted how
the sheer number of destinations observed by Aretha made
the firewall difficult to use: “I found that I got a bit lost on
occasion”. But unlike P1’s behavioural control mechanism,
P2 did not go on to develop their own control mechanisms in
place of the firewall. Instead, P2 mentioned having previously
investigated a variety of different options and expressed a lack
of control over the family’s data flows that did not change over
the course of the study.
However, by the end of the study, P2 was able to extend his
original definition of what privacy meant to him. This centred
around the purpose of products and behaviours, particularly
how companies balanced meeting user needs against fulfilling
other business purposes such as generating advertising revenue,
a balance he was adamant needed to remain in the favour of the
user. Vocabulary centred around proportionality was used to
compare the data flows shown by Aretha with his previous ex-
pectations, reflecting that to some extent this was a symptom of
the highly interconnected nature of the modern world wide web.
In contrast to P1, P2 drew a clear distinction between
information sent to the authorities versus information collected
by private companies, and highlighted the importance of
keeping insights from devices anonymous and aggregated
rather than hyper-personalised:
“It’s not so much that they know that three thousand people
have watched this particular YouTube video, it’s do they know
that I have watched this YouTube video?”
Household 3
The third participant lived with her partner and daughter. While
the online accounts associated with devices in the house were
registered to P3, their partner was responsible for administering
devices. The privacy assistant was installed in the hallway
between the kitchen and living room of their house, making
it easy to glance at throughout the day.
Similarly to P1, P3 had difficulty describing what privacy meant
to her beyond it being important, focusing on a previous bad
experience where an organisation had published her personal de-
tails without consent. Overall, P3 reported being less engaged
with the privacy assistant over the course of the study, often
observing new names but being less proactive in investigating
them. She found that further research into companies listed
as destinations in Aretha was less effective at addressing her
concerns. Unlike P1 and P2, P3 was not primarily responsible
for the technology in the home, instead deferring to her partner
who worked in the IT sector sector, and usage of the privacy
assistant between them also appeared to fall into this pattern.
Of surprise were the varied jurisdictions that data was flowing
to, and the relationship between action in the house and
what was detected by Aretha. This was particularly the case
with brand ownership, where activities would show on the
visualisation as unexpected companies due to previously
unknown corporate structures.
Like the other participants, P3 expressed reluctance to use
the firewall due to the risk of unexpected consequences.
Unsatisfactory experiences with parental controls when her
daughter was growing up factored in to her decision to not
use the firewall. The experience did, however, make her much
more aware of control mechanisms that she had subconsciously
been ignoring. Suddenly she began to notice the cookie
opt-out dialogues presented to her on websites, as well as the
permission prompts on her phone:
“So I guess under normal circumstances I wouldn’t have cared,
but now I’m thinking I don’t want you to have access to my
phone, I don’t want you to have access to my contacts”
Much more important for P3 though, were the practical steps
they could take as a family. Shared discussions about the way
the family used and shared online accounts led to a moratorium
on account sharing by their daughter, as well proposing the cre-
ation of a ‘bogus’ email account that could be used to sign up for
apps and services. As a result of these steps P3 reported feeling
more in control of their data than at the beginning of the study.
P3’s conception of what privacy meant to her also evolved over
the course of the study. With some prompts for clarification,
she described a purpose-based model similar to that of P2,
where data that was extracted from the household needed to
be related to a specific purpose that benefited them (such as
processing a transaction). This included discussions around
data inference, where P3 had used the educational content from
the curriculum to develop her understanding of the ecosystem
their apps and devices existed in.
DISCUSSION
Revisiting the Design Goals - What Did We Learn?
Our technology probe aimed to empower people by providing
the three kinds of support outlined by our probe design goals.
In this section, we revisit these design goals in order to reflect
on participants’ experiences as they relate to each kind of
support, before examining how they interrelate.
With respect to DG1 (Legibility), there was much evidence to
support the view that, by the end of the study, households were
significantly more aware of data disclosures of their connected
devices. In general, each participant had their own expectations
of what the probe would show, and subsequently went through
a process of reconciling this with the reality shown by the
visualisations. While to begin with, participants were mainly
interested in who devices were sending data to, over the course
of the deployment this shifted to what information devices
were sending and why as their awareness and curiosity grew.
Notably, participants tended to focus on the breadth of their
data exposure rather than the volume of data going to any
particular destination. To an extent this is to be expected given
that novel destinations invoke more curiosity than larger traffic
magnitudes, but P2 was the only participant that mentioned
the ‘disproportionate’ amount of data flowing to Google and
Facebook. For the other households, the unfamiliarity of new
companies represented a bigger threat than the inference risks
of larger ones, even though on average the top three companies
for each household accounted for 74% of the traffic collected by
Aretha. Participants were more familiar with these companies,
and trust certainly plays into the assessment of risk, but one
might have expected more interest in this asymmetry given that
user generated privacy strategies in prior work have included
depth versus breadth of exposure as a central theme [59].
Participant experiences with respect to DG2 (Interpretability)
were more varied. On one hand, there was evidence to support
the view that the educational material supported interpretation
and understanding of the network data flows. All participants
said that they believed the content in the curriculum had made
them think differently about their exposure. The participants
who reported engaging more with the curriculum (P1 and
P3) also began to incorporate the curriculum concepts and
terms into their discussions about privacy, most notably around
data sharing. On the other hand, P3 delegated some of the
curriculum mini-lessons to her partner, who was the primary in-
dividual responsible for managing the technology in the home.
The material was also not seen as useful by all participants; P2
felt that he was already aware of the concepts presented and
as a result engaged less with the curriculum content.
With respect to DG3 (Actionable Controls), it was clear that
the firewall control did not meet the intended design goal, but
still yielded valuable insights into how future tools might better
achieve this. Participants created very few firewall rules to
block traffic, even though these controls were made contextually
situated, easy to use, and prominent within the assistant. We
believe there were several reasons for this; a primary reason
being that there were simply too many data destinations to
worry about, a majority of which corresponded to companies
unfamiliar to participants. As a result, participants felt they had
to evaluate each one individually, and this was simply too much
work. The fact that the probe failed to indicate whether it would
be ‘safe’ to block destinations also affected firewall usage; when
one of P2’s blocking actions accidentally disabled essential
functionality, they were discouraged from using it further.
Where participants chose their own alternative methods of
control, we saw how they took the situational awareness and
conceptual grounding that they had been given through Aretha
and integrated this with their existing social practices (P1’s eth-
ical consumerism and P3’s family discussions). Even though
P2 did not develop control mechanisms during the study, in the
entry interview they expressed a desire to build the probe into
their existing security practices to find vulnerabilities in their
network. We see that the strength of future tools likely depends
on how well they integrate themselves into day to day activities,
rather than the raw power they provide as technical tools.
Supporting Roles in Privacy Management
During the study, the probe seemed to serve a variety of differ-
ent, yet key roles in supporting household privacy management
practices. We briefly describe three such roles in this section.
Formulating and experimenting with privacy preferences and
strategies—A primary role was in supporting the grounding of
privacy goals and strategies in terms relating to specific entities,
actions and relationships (bringing them closer to the basic
ontology of contextual integrity [43]). At the start of the study,
participants expressed concerns in more abstract and general
terms, including those corresponding to privacy risks. By the
end of the study, however, participants described personalised
goals in terms of actors (companies/data controllers), devices,
and disclosure actions. Moreover, they were readily able to
generate ideas for strategies to achieve their goals, and translate
these into actions they could take. Finally, the visualisations fa-
cilitated experimentation by providing real-time feedback of the
effects of their actions on their exposure, such as accessing cer-
tain web sites or using particular apps. Such feedback could be
essential for enabling participants to test strategies by assessing
the effectiveness of individual actions they might take to achieve
their goals (thus supporting the kind of positive feedback loops
between beliefs and action noted in prior research [61]).
Increasing salience and fostering interest in other household-
ers—A second important role was the way that the probe
brought about not just a heightened awareness of privacy
concerns—by being a salient and visible physical totem in their
living room—but a transformative one, in which privacy man-
agement transitioned from being a solo concern anchored with
the individual responsible for technology within the home, to
one discussed between multiple home stakeholders. The visibil-
ity of the probe within the home inspired conversations among
household members, and the visualisations provided a common
ground for discussion of disclosures, activities, and devices.
Supporting accountability of devices, companies, and users
themselves—Participants reported on how legibility (DG1),
interpretability (DG2), and control (DG3) did and potentially
could further empower them in holding devices, companies,
and even each other to account. While each household in the
study used the affordances of Aretha for different purposes,
the lens of accountability allows us to see how these features
are reflected in their use of the probe.
P1 felt empowered through insights and knowledge not only to
express clear preferences of not using the services of unethical
companies but also stated their preference of not having
business with any partners of those companies. They identified
these partners by proxy of information flows “between”
companies from the probe’s user interface. In doing so, P1
used the probe to hold themselves accountable to their own
moral standards, as well as the companies they deemed to be
operating unethically (see the Amazon example in the results).
For P2, the probe presented a means by which they intended
to hold their devices accountable as a way to search for security
vulnerabilities in their network. However, they were discontent
with the amounts of data being shared with any of the large
internet corporations, asking what data was being shared and
why. They further expressed the desire to better control these
flows of data and hold these companies to account in the future.
The case was different for P3 who was less familiar with the
intricacies of connected devices, their data collection, and
manufacturers’ processing practices; they were not responsible
for technology in the family. However, they did engage their
partner “who knew all of this already” in a conversation on the
educational content, and talked to their daughter about sharing
accounts with friends.
These examples of reported preferences and behaviour from
experiences with Aretha resemble notions of ordinary privacy
practices reported in prior research, hinting at the potential
for privacy-empowering technologies to “[enable] people to
manage their relationships within the home and with others
beyond it” [11].
Informing the Design of Future Home Privacy Tools
Reflections on the design goals for privacy-empowering tools
in the home show the interrelatedness of situational awareness
and understanding; information from visualisations and other
mechanisms must be tightly interwoven with educational
content. A good example of this from the study is the contextual
examples provided alongside curriculum modules, providing
concrete, personalised examples of how activities in the home
related to the more abstract concepts being taught. The shift in
questioning from who to why and what presents an opportunity
to explore this further. Visualisations and controls based around
behaviours rather than destinations place a focus on the types of
information that different companies have, and invite questions
over what could be done with the information that were missing
from the study responses. The design of the ‘Polly’ smart kettle
might serve as inspiration for how to combine these [39].
The ways that participants used the probe to hold people
and companies accountable at a number of different levels
suggests that it might be beneficial from a research perspective
to highlight this when designing controls. The firewall in the
study was concerned with companies and devices, but controls
could similarly be concerned with people, market sectors, or
even entire corporate structures (e.g. block data to companies
owned by Facebook).
P2’s response to the curriculum suggests that future tools could
also benefit from tailoring content to the prior knowledge of
participants in order to maintain engagement. Additionally,
when P3 delegated parts of the learning experience, it exposed
the aims of the probe as running counter to the role of P3’s
partner as the household device administrator—explicitly
tailoring a curriculum to each member of the household may
offer a means of furthering DG2 in future studies.
Rethinking Firewalling
Addressing the challenges identified with DG3, several
approaches could make firewalling actions easier and safer.
One idea came directly from P1, who suggested outsourcing
some of the burden to assistants or experts. One example
might be to allow experts to pre-curate custom blacklists that
could be selectively enabled and later be overridden by users
if necessary. This ‘ad blocker for the home’ approach, which
is one taken by tools such as PiHole6, seems promising and
almost obvious as a useful feature in retrospect, and should be
strongly considered in future versions of Aretha.
A slightly more sophisticated approach could be providing
more powerful operators for allowing sets of destinations to
be blocked en masse based on their characteristics (or those of
the data flows themselves). Based on the study, useful charac-
teristics would likely include company reputation, jurisdiction,
purpose of data collection, retention and disclosure properties.
A ‘learning by example’ approach could interactively help
people block hosts based on a single action (e.g. “if you blocked
destination X, you might want to block similar destination Y”).
6pi-hole.net
Beyond making it easier, it was clear that what was needed was
better visibility and feedback to blocking actions—i.e. a way
to make the potential effects and consequences of blocking
actions clearer in advance. This stemmed from the ability of the
firewall to break the functionality of apps and devices in ways
that might not be immediately apparent. The lack of immediate
cause and effect increased the difficulty of diagnosing problems,
and was further complicated by the fact that only one household
member typically had the expertise required to fix problems
related to the firewall. The ‘management by exception’
approach in which privacy and security decisions are revisited
primarily when problems arise [28] suggests an opportunity for
giving people better tools for not only debugging but revisiting
and refining their blocking decisions when things break.
Enhancing Legibility and Accountability
A key limitation we identified going into the study was the
inability for the probe to inspect and make visible the contents
of traffic flows. Our findings suggest that such a capability
would nonetheless be beneficial to improving legibility and
accountability. As described above, participants were inter-
ested not just in the identities of data controllers, their business
models, and reputations, but the contents and sensitivity of
what was disclosed, shown by questions pertaining to why the
data were captured, and how such data would be later used.
As the need to harden systems against attackers motivates
developers to eliminate the few remaining methods used by
researchers to directly intercept encrypted traffic contents, it
will be increasingly challenging to reliably realise such an
inspection capability. Machine learning driven approaches
like HomeSnitch [46] that classify device behaviours based
on network traffic are promising, but come with several
limitations, including that models need to be trained on specific
devices and behaviours beforehand, and may not identify the
complete contents of such flows.
Enabling end-users to gain an awareness of how data are used,
retained, and disclosed by data controllers is another challenge
entirely. We intend to explore the role that legal approaches,
including rights given through the EU General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) might be applied to crowdsource such
information in future work.
Balancing Destinations and Accumulative Risks
Another limitation of the Aretha probe may have been in the
ways it made salient the numbers and identities of destinations,
potentially shifting participants’ focus away from the large
quantities of data being collected by platforms such as
Facebook, Amazon, and Google. Although these platforms
appeared prominently in every visualisation, they were often
not the focus of concern. Future privacy-empowering tools
should try to seek a better balance between emphasising
destinations and the accumulative privacy risks of data
harvested by large platforms.
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In line with prior HCI technology probe work (e.g. [9, 26], we
opted for the depth of longer-term case studies with a carefully
selected small sample of families. Inherent to the nature of the
method, this means that the results can provide holistic under-
standing of individual appropriation of the technologies (and a
resulting design inspiration). However, such a sample is clearly
not meant to be representative of the wider population: the
observed experiences were likely influenced by selecting early
adopters, who were already interested in the aims of the study.
It will be interesting to contrast the temporal trajectories and
impacts Aretha (and similar technologies) might have on less
interested or technology savvy audiences. In addition, future
deployments of similar probe-like technologies could be a use-
ful tool with which to unpack the relationships between privacy
preference formation (especially across a range of skill and
interests), and the shared use of tools by participants. Finally,
the particular instantiation of the proposed design goals within
Aretha is far from being the only ‘solution’; nor is it the best so-
lution possible. In the spirit of the technology probe approach,
we suggest that our specific design choices are seen only as an
early exemplar for a broader class of privacy-empowering tools,
hopefully inspiring a variety of different socio-technical en-
sembles to address the underlying research questions in future.
CONCLUSION
Given their unique contexts, members, and skills, each of our
three households went on a different journey during the study.
Aretha enabled us to probe the ways they could understand,
interact with, and use their connected devices and explore the
potential for future privacy-empowering technologies in the
connected home. Not all elements of the design goals were
successful for all participants, pointing to a range of unmet
needs (especially in relation to active controls). The lack of
engagement with the firewall was instructive in its own way;
while most participants found it difficult to use effectively, due
to having already observed, interpreted, and understood the
underlying behaviour of their devices they appeared better able
to adapt, invent, or imagine other protective mechanisms, tools,
and strategies.
By embodying an alternative vision of decentralised, user-
empowering IoT infrastructure, Aretha is also a timely
reminder that there are alternative ways to engineer the
connected home. While some device manufacturers (such
as Apple) appear to be embracing more privacy-preserving
approaches, end-users may still want an independent means
by which they can monitor, audit, and control their devices’
disclosures, not only to validate claims made by manufacturers
but also to help them better understand how their devices
connect to external organisations and systems.
The enormity of the opaque data ecosystem that connected
homes are unwittingly tied to could easily be overwhelming.
But the results of our probe suggest that all may not be lost;
when provided with the right kind of scaffolding, perhaps
people can begin to get a handle on the phenomenon, formulate
their own informed attitudes and strategies, and better situate
themselves within the socio-technical, economic and political
realities of the increasingly-connected private realm.
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